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The rise of standardization processes highlights two different paths toward
a regulatory state. Within the EU, the New Approach serves as a model
for co-regulation, and European standards have become instruments of
supranational governance. In France, standardization is much more part
of a renegotiation of the state’s role and inﬂuence in a changing society. In
both cases, standardization was undertaken with other motives; yet it
evolved to answer the strains and constraints exerted upon regulatory
processes in the two polities. As such, standards are a case for
unintentionality in policy instruments.
 
There is practically no economic activity nowadays that is not framed,
whether partly or totally, by standards. Their extension is closely related
to economic globalization and the transformation of regulatory processes
at the international, regional, and national levels—even though histori-
cally they often precede these phenomena. Our interest in standards is
the result of their inﬂuence on economic activities along with the fact that
their underlying logic resonates with political and economic processes
that can be observed worldwide.
According to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
a standard is a “document established by consensus that provides, for
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activi-
ties or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of
order in a given context.” Where a good, a service, or a procedure is
concerned, there is almost always at some level—national, European, or
international—a document deﬁning the form it should take. Standards
enable them to circulate, to be compatible with other goods, services, or
procedures, or even to be made predictable in nature. Hence, the strength-
ening of free trade is favorable to their development.
Standards can fall under two categories: de jure and de facto standards.
A de jure standard is a written document establishing technical speciﬁca-
tions for goods, services, or processes, resulting from a consensus, and
whose application is voluntary. It is designed to fulﬁll coordination func-
tions through production (by giving producers information useful in
 58 OLIVIER BORRAZ
 
designing new products) and exchange (by making explicit the speciﬁed
properties of a product). A de facto standard results from a unilateral act
and emerges through the mediation of market processes: “the dynamic
in which purchasers on a market take up particular products ﬁnally leads
to one or more lasting standards being selected from among diverse
possible alternative technologies” (Lelong and Mallard 2000, 20). The
software and hardware architecture of personal computers (PCs) is an
illustration of a de facto standard, while the Global system for Mobile
communication (GSM) protocol in telecommunications is a de jure stan-
dard because it “was drawn up as a result of collective activity within the
framework of a standards institute, in which the leading actors in the
telecommunications sector took part. Its appearance has actually involved
coordination mechanisms alternative to, or additional to, the dynamic of
the market alone” (21). In what follows, we shall be mainly interested in
de jure standards.
As public policy instruments, standards
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 present several characteris-
tics. Although often highly technical in nature, they are actually the prod-
uct of a balance of power between economic actors (competitors or
subcontractors) as well as between economic actors and nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) (such as consumer or user groups) within civil
society. Thus, they contribute to a shift in rulemaking from the state to
civil society. The legitimacy of standards derives from a scientiﬁc and
technical rationality (which helps to neutralize their political signiﬁcance)
along with a democratic rationality (through their negotiated dimension).
Thus, they offer the appearance of depoliticization (Jobert 2003). In other
words, the development of standards forms part of a trend that sees
public authorities delegating to private organizations the enactment of
rules that, even if they do not have the force of law, are no less binding
in nature. This movement is all the more legitimate, seemingly, because
it is surrounded by references to the democratic nature of the process of
drawing up standards and to the scientiﬁc and technical data on which
they are based. In a way, standardization could amount to a paciﬁed
decision-making process because it leaves the matter to the interested
parties, without political intervention. The terms “technological democ-
racy” (Hawkins 2000) or “technical diplomacy” (Cochoy 2000) have been
used, critically, to characterize this process.
Yet, our interest in this category of instrument results from their
inscription within a regulatory framework. In this respect, France and the
EU offer the opportunity to compare the role of standards in two very
different polities, both moving toward a form of regulatory state. What
does the rise of standardization processes tell us about the nature and
content of such a state? Apart from issues of depoliticization and incentive
rather than normative-based instruments, is there something else that can
be learned from the study of standards? I want to argue that this is the
case on four accounts: re-regulation, intentionality, policy-capture, and
the management of complex issues.
 RISE OF STANDARDIZATION PROCESSES IN FRANCE AND IN THE EU 59
 
The development of standardization processes can contribute to a form
of “re-regulation” (Majone 1996). Even though part of a deregulation
movement, standards simultaneously contribute to a proliferation of rules
framing economic activity. Thus, according to the French Standardization
Association (AFNOR
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), a standard “is a public policy tool that acts as a
supplement to regulation and a reference point for opening up public
markets and promoting their transparency.” While the European Parlia-
ment speciﬁes that “standardization can constitute an effective, generally
acceptable and readily adaptable supplement to legislation, and can in
some cases, if given a clear legal framework, provide an alternative to
binding rules and regulations.”
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In fact, standard-setting is a clear case of “meta-regulation,” in which
“direct intervention and enforcement are replaced here with allegedly
lighter demands on economic actors to institutionalize processes of self-
regulation” (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004, 7), allegedly because in fact this
type of regulation often proves to be as intrusive as direct intervention
aimed at monitoring and enforcing competition. Furthermore, this trend
is congruent with the advent of the regulatory state, and such notable
features as “the proliferation of new mechanisms and techniques of reg-
ulation, meta-regulation, and enforced self-regulation” (Levi-Faur and
Gilad 2004).
The question of intentionality is central to the study of instruments. As
the two cases presented in this article will make clear, standards are
instruments that “open new perspectives for use or interpretation by
political entrepreneurs, which have not been provided for and are difﬁcult
to control, thus fueling a dynamic of institutionalization” (introduction to
this issue). Hence, they contribute to stabilizing collective action, by mak-
ing the actors’ behavior more predictable, but simultaneously they offer
new opportunities along with new resources for actors to pursue other
goals. At the European level, standards were initially conceived as an
instrument of intergovernmental politics destined to quicken the pace
toward the achievement of a single market, but they progressively opened
perspectives for a more integrated approach and became an instrument
of supranational governance for the European Commission. In France,
following a series of crises that revealed major dysfunctions within the
state, along with a restructuring of the state in a context of economic
globalization and European construction, administrative authorities saw
the use they could make of standards in regulating highly complex and
interdependent domains, or in promoting French economic interests on a
wider scale. Thus, standards became an instrument of state transforma-
tion. In both cases, these developments were not initially intended. But
the standardization process opened perspectives which public adminis-
trations seized to uphold their interests.
The study of standards also enables us to revisit the thesis of the
“policy capture” of decision-making processes by economic interests
because standardization explicitly provides for industry representatives
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to participate in drawing up rules that concern them. This can be seen as
an answer to the growing problems public authorities face in obtaining
detailed knowledge of the activity they wish to regulate. Yet, there is a
difference between, on the one hand, a situation where lobbies negotiate
measures favorable to them directly with French public authorities or the
“continued institutionalization of interest intermediation” by the Euro-
pean Commission (Mazey and Richardson 2001, 92) and, on the other, the
constraint for lobbies to negotiate a compromise with other interest
groups under limited possibility for public arbitration. Such a develop-
ment, in fact, strengthens the public authorities’ situation because it pro-
tects them from most of the pressures but still gives them the capacity to
have a say on the outcome of negotiations.
Finally, standards occupy a special place in relation to the crisis of
legitimacy affecting public intervention, the complexity of the issues tack-
led and the theme of accountability in public policy—and they raise new
questions of legitimacy, efﬁciency, and accountability.
 
Governments as political actors can use resources from both the public and
private sector to bolster their regulatory goals and pursue their objectives. The
willingness to delegate important policy-making powers is in large part a
recognition that regulation is not achieved by simply passing a law, but requires
active involvement of regulated ﬁrms. Because regulators lack information that
only regulated ﬁrms have, ﬁrms themselves are acting like governments, by
establishing regulations and codes of conduct in economic, environmental, and
social areas. The growth of such business self-regulation is difﬁcult to equate
with the usual deﬁnitions of regulation perceived in terms of government
activity, since it crosses the boundaries between providing a mix of public,
private, or collective goods. (Egan 2001, 6)
 
This article will show that standardization processes play a different role
with regard to the strains and constraints exerted upon French and EU
regulatory processes. In this respect, standards are not neutral devices
but instruments that produce speciﬁc (and sometimes unintended)
effects, depending on the regulatory framework within which they take
place.
The ﬁrst section of the article begins by constructing the object “stan-
dards.” The second section then reports on the place of standard-setting
in the European integration project. The third section will focus on France
and the recent growth of standards in service activities. The conclusion
will attempt to distinguish the varying status and effects of standard-
setting in different regulatory contexts.
 
1. Deﬁning Standards
 
Standards share four major characteristics: they are the result of a work
carried out among interested parties, they are based on scientiﬁc and
technical data, they rely on consensus, and their application remains
voluntary.
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1. The concept of interested parties is extremely variable because it
may come down to just a given sector of industry or include con-
sumer and user representatives, public authorities, and experts. In
his history of standardization in France, Cochoy (2000) distin-
guishes between a period when industry alone invested in stan-
dardization and a period when, through the impetus of AFNOR,
consumers joined the committees, starting a profound shift in the
areas covered by standards. At the EU level, European standards
institutes provide for the participation of various representatives:
from trade unions, consumer groups, local governments, national
government ofﬁcials, individual ﬁrms, and trade associations.
Standard-setting thus constitutes a procedure in which the partici-
pants have formally the same rights and the same inﬂuence. How-
ever, there are generally profound inequalities between them in
terms of access to information. Furthermore, scholars of standard-
ization processes stress that chairing or acting as secretary to a
standardization committee offers a strategic position, from which it
is possible to determine both the agenda and the pace of work—
two deﬁning resources in inﬂuencing the ﬁnal outcome.
2. Even though the process of standardization brings together inter-
ested parties, their exchanges are based on scientiﬁc, technical, or
experimental data (Joerges, Ladeur, and Vos 1997). Jacobsson (2000,
40) stresses that standardization relies on expert knowledge: “stan-
dardization is closely linked to expertise and is usually motivated
by the view that there are some persons who know
best. . . . Reference to expert knowledge is often used to give stan-
dardization legitimacy.” This is evidenced by the fact that partici-
pants in expert committees are nominated for their knowledge in
the ﬁeld concerned. “The committees provide a forum for those
with considerable knowledge in a particular ﬁeld to work together”
(Egan 2001, 143). However, there is still a very wide variation
between the participants’ levels of expertise and—even more so—
their resources to mobilize scientiﬁc and technical data: it is very
often the largest ﬁrms, which have their own interest in standard-
ization, that provide the data on which the discussions are to be
based, while small and medium enterprises (SMEs) rarely have the
capacity to take an active part in standardization work, and NGOs
are often in a dependent situation.
The importance of scientiﬁc and technical data, apart from leading
to a strong distinction between participants, also acts as a formal
constraint (Mallard 2000). Although a standard stems from a com-
promise based on political, economic, and social criteria, only its
technical elements are made visible. Putting these technical ele-
ments forward in the discussion allows the exclusion of other crite-
ria from the debates or obliges such criteria, once they have become
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the object of a compromise, to be expressed in technical terms. This
acts as a constraint essentially at the development stage, notably for
those participants who do not have a mastery of all aspects or are
not in a position to make counterproposals. Once the standard is
put into practice, on the contrary, industry actors are able to rein-
troduce some ﬂexibility in interpreting the technical data (Majone
1975 in Egan 2001).
3. Consensus is a core principle of the standardization process. All
documents and all observers refer to it, the latter in order to empha-
size its ambiguous nature. Consensus is most often understood
negatively: it is the opposite of voting; it does not necessarily imply
unanimity. In other words, to use an ISO deﬁnition, it is a “general
agreement characterized by the absence of deﬁnite opposition to the
essence of the subject from a large part of the interests in play and
by a process of seeking to take into consideration the views of all
those concerned and to reconcile possible but divergent positions.”
Therefore, consensus occurs when, at the end of a process in which
the different parties have been able to express their expectations and
integrate them into a proposed standard, no participant is openly
opposed to this proposal. As long as one party is opposed, the
approach cannot be carried through to its end; this very often results
in processes that extend over several years and require long nego-
tiations. This is because standard-setting is not a repetitive, iterative
game, but a unique one: once the standard has been adopted, it
becomes irreversible. The participants cannot adopt a strategy of
short-term loss or sacriﬁce for a deferred gain or a time-shifted
“quid pro quo” (Egan 2001, 144). The result is a document that links
the interests of the various parties and is binding on them all,
following a participatory process that establishes the standard’s
legitimacy: “writing a standard is much more than an activity for
producing technical information and speciﬁcations: it contributes
actively to the convergence of the socio-technical networks that
constitute the standard’s coordinating framework” (Mallard 2000,
26).
4. The ﬁnal characteristic of standards is that they are presented as
voluntary. Here, we are in the realm of what Morand (1999) calls
“incentive acts,” that is, “acts that direct behaviors without making
them compulsory” (162). Economic actors are not obliged to comply
with a standard, and they are not subject to any sanction. Standard-
izers “must convince potential adopters that they would beneﬁt
from following the standards” (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000, 13).
This can be contested, on three accounts. First, industrials must often
show that their product, service, or activity conforms to the regula-
tory requirements or meets the quality and safety criteria: EU direc-
tives refer to standards in this respect, but industrials can always
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choose to demonstrate compliance through other means. Second, in
some cases, regulation explicitly references consensus-based,
privately developed standards as bases for gauging compliance
with the regulation. Third, regulation can even make standard-
compliance compulsory (the French 
 
normes d’application obligatoire
 
).
Furthermore, because many standards are accompanied by markings
(“NF,” “CE”) that certify they observe a set of conditions, because they
may be required by the authorities or requested by potential customers,
and ﬁnally because they are part of the circulation of goods on increas-
ingly extensive markets, the incentives to become involved in standard-
setting are strong. While failure to conform to provisions contained in a
standard can lead to a ﬁrm’s certiﬁcation being withdrawn—with conse-
quences potentially more costly than a ﬁne. Moreover, a judge can refer
to a standard when assessing an industrial’s liability. Finally, some
standards acquire force of law at the international level, such as 
 
Codex
Alimentarius’
 
 standards, recognized by the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO): countries are not
compelled to respect these standards but then risk facing litigation within
the WTO.
Contrary to what these four features could indicate, standardization is
neither a neutral nor a peaceful process. But it offers a speciﬁc framework
for solving conﬂicts. The diverging interests, tensions, and conﬂicts are
settled through negotiations and at an interpersonal level. “In general,
. . . participant accounts of such committees typically emphasize compro-
mise, teamwork, and sharing information, rather than how these bodies
deal with conﬂicts” (Egan 2001, 143). While it is obvious that these com-
mittees are characterized by profound resource inequalities, it is equally
obvious that the dominant actors have no interest in taking advantage of
their position to impose their views on the other participants. In taking
this approach, they have to enter into information-sharing, take into
account requests, and seek compromise, which allows them to increase
the value of their resources while gradually involving the other parties.
This is a long, exacting task, in which any attempt to rush decision making
may lead to blocking. In fact, this is very often the case. However, it can
be hypothesized that these are powerful learning tools for participants,
who learn to work together (Kessous 2000, 114).
Consequently, the constraining nature of a process that obliges the
various participants to take into account the interests of the others may
counter the partially founded criticism that sees these committees merely
as parodies of “technological democracy,” in which powerful, perfectly
organized economic interests (industrial or national) manage to impose
their point of view under the guise of consensus.
 
In the area of standardization “. . . all actors . . . do not merely try to seek con-
ﬁrmation for previously formed views, but frequently enter committee discus-
sions without clear preferences, or are prepared to change their positions. This
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does not mean, however, that positions and interests play no part whatsoever
in committee negotiations. Nevertheless, in a signiﬁcant number of cases, the
main focus was upon the discussion of a problem where solutions had  to  be
found  without  those  participating  being  able  to  fall  back  upon  pre-formu-
lated positions. Moreover, . . . comitology operates as a long-term oriented pro-
cess of working and learning, that has a potential, over time, to condemn and
overcome individual attempts on the part of participants to impede reliance
upon valid knowledge. (Joerges 1999, 320)
 
2. The European “New Approach”
 
On May 7, 1985, the European Council adopted a 
 
new approach to technical
harmonization and standards
 
 (Resolution 85/C 136/01). Up to then, techni-
cal harmonization had been covered by directives or by the mutual rec-
ognition procedure. But the technical complexity of the subjects
concerned, the difﬁculty of bringing all countries into agreement, and the
single-market perspective encouraged the European authorities to take
recourse to standard-setting.
The 1985 Council Resolution is based on the conclusions approved by
the Council of July 16, 1984, which read: “The Council believes that
standardization goes a long way towards ensuring that industrial prod-
ucts can be marketed freely and also towards creating a standard technical
environment for undertakings in all countries, which improves competi-
tiveness not only on the Community market but also on external markets,
especially in new technology.” The objective, therefore, is to bypass obsta-
cles to free movement.
The 1985 resolution was supplemented by another resolution on a
global approach to conformity assessment, dated July 24, 1989. In the
context of this new approach, European legislation became responsible
for establishing the essential requirements to which products must con-
form, while the European standards institutes (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI
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)
were charged with drawing up technical speciﬁcations in order to ensure
conformity to deﬁned thresholds or levels of protection.
This wider use of standards comes at a particular moment in European
history. This can be observed on two accounts.
First, several writers associate the development of standards with the
limits of the European integration project from the 1980s onwards. Thus,
according to Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000), the choice of standards
rather than directives stems from the difﬁculties encountered by Euro-
pean institutions in imposing compulsory measures. The recourse to stan-
dards is therefore a response to the absence of any constraining means at
the EU’s disposal to accompany its regulatory activity—an absence for
which the incentives linked to the application of standards can compen-
sate. Other authors suggest that the use of standards is a consequence of
the Commission’s difﬁculties in arriving at agreement between the mem-
ber states in a number of ﬁelds. In support of this thesis, they cite the
delay in drawing up directives for the 1992 single market.
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The creation of a single market by 31 December 1992 could not have been
achieved without a new regulatory technique that set down only the general
essential requirements, reduced the control of public authorities prior to a
product being placed on the market, and integrated quality assurance and other
modern conformity assessment techniques. Moreover, the decision-making
procedure needed to be adapted in order to facilitate the adoption of technical
harmonization directives by a qualiﬁed majority in the Council.
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Second, the recourse to standard-setting is an intrinsic feature of the rise
of a European “regulatory state” (Majone 1994, 1999). The same reasons
that played a part in that rise—budget constraints, bureaucratic, and
economic interests, poor credibility of intergovernmental arrangements,
the highly technical nature of regulatory policy making (Majone 1994,
92)—account for the success of standards. The same motives that led the
European institutions to delegate powers to independent agencies also
apply: cognitive factors (lack of expertise and competence), reducing the
costs of decision making, and blame avoidance or blame shifting (Majone
1999, 3–4). In other words, standard-setting allows the public authorities
to achieve credible political commitments, which take into account the
phenomena of political and economic interdependence among nations
and, at the same time, allows the behavior of multiple actors to be guar-
anteed other than by command-and-control techniques (5).
 
The Invention of the New Approach
 
The New Approach is based on the distinction between essential require-
ments and technical speciﬁcations. A “New Approach directive” applies
either to a broad, sufﬁciently homogenous range of products or to a
horizontal risk; most often, it covers the risks linked to a family of prod-
uct. “Essential requirements” deﬁne the results to be achieved or the
dangers to be dealt with, without going into the content of the technical
solutions needed to attain this (they are functional or performance stan-
dards, as opposed to prescriptive or speciﬁcation standards: Majone 1996,
112). This avoids having to regularly amend directives to take account of
technical progress because a product’s conformity is not assessed on the
basis of the state of the art at a given time.
This distinction between essential requirements and technical speciﬁ-
cations is not self-evident. It is not easy, at the outset, to conceive objec-
tives without simultaneously providing for the means to achieve them.
Furthermore, a move toward harmonization justiﬁed only on economic
grounds could easily have been contested by national authorities and
businesses anxious to preserve their own particular features.
On both accounts, the response was to put forward health and safety.
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More precisely, the concept of risk became a vehicle for the setting of
standards. It allowed broad objectives (reducing or eliminating all risk
linked to the use of a product) to be laid down, and off-loaded onto the
standards institutes the task of arriving at documents that, while integrat-
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ing health and safety imperatives, also contributed to technical harmoni-
zation at the European scale and the competitiveness of European ﬁrms
at the international level. This approach thus offered the advantage of
leading more easily to an agreement between the member states and
transferring the constraints of negotiation onto the standard-setting pro-
cess. In dissociating general objectives from the means of reaching them,
the Council wanted to avoid technical considerations (reﬂecting in fact
economic, political, or social interests) disrupting the terms of require-
ments on which all countries must be able to agree. The payoff for this is
a relative vagueness in the objectives: although the Council insists that
requirements should be “worded precisely enough in order to create, on
transposition into national law, legally binding obligations,” directives
often state very general objectives.
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The New Approach rests on several pillars, three of which should be
mentioned here.
The ﬁrst concerns standards institutes: CEN, CENELEC, and later ETSI
must have suitable staff and infrastructure to carry through the setting of
standards. The Commission negotiated mandates with them to make
their role ofﬁcial, deﬁne their tasks, and set out the principles to which
the European authorities are dedicated.
The second pillar concerns “the association of public authorities and
interested circles (in particular manufacturers, users, consumers,
unions).” This element, as well as stemming from the fact that legitimacy
is at stake, reﬂects the Council’s concern to extend responsibility for
drawing up standards to the largest number of interested parties in order
to ensure their efﬁcient implementation. This pillar plays an essential role,
among other things, in distinguishing the type of regulation promoted by
the EU from traditional forms of corporatism in the different member
states (Ladeur 1999, 157).
The third pillar relates to methods of monitoring standards: this is
the object of the 1989 Council Resolution on 
 
a global approach to assessing
conformity
 
, supplemented by two Council decisions establishing
detailed speciﬁcations for testing and certiﬁcation procedures and pro-
viding guidance for use of the “CE” marking. Conformity is assessed
on the basis of the manufacturer’s internal activities for monitoring
design and production; examination by an outside body of the type,
design, or products; approval by an outside body of overall quality
assurance systems.
The New Approach, nonetheless, faces an important limiting factor:
there are markets in which the actors are not interested in setting stan-
dards. In this case, a directive has little chance of leading to technical
speciﬁcations; two examples are building products and electrical plugs.
As the Commission points out, “acceptance of standardization is related
to the market relevance of standards, and not only to the participation of
the parties concerned.”
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 Therefore, if it does not want to go unheeded,
any directive that delegates the deﬁnition of means and methods of
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implementation to the standard-setting process must take into account
the state of the market and of technological advances.
 
The Debates over European Standard-Setting
 
Early in the 1990s, during the process of completing the single market,
the Commission expressed reservations about the efﬁciency of standard-
ization and suggested some modiﬁcations. During the years that followed,
these reservations gave way to debates, in particular between the Com-
mission, the Parliament, and the standards institutes. These debates took
place in the ongoing tension between intergovernmental and suprana-
tional modes of decision making within the EU (Stone Sweet and Sand-
holtz 1998). Even though the Council and the Parliament, on the one hand,
and the Commission, on the other, all agreed on the need to reinforce the
role of standards, the latter saw these as a means to achieve more effec-
tively and rapidly a single market, while the former aimed to maintain
standard-setting within an intergovernmental framework of negotiation.
While the Commission intended to promote standards as instruments of
supranational governance, capable of bypassing national obstacles to the
free movement of goods and services, the Council and the Parliament
considered that standards could improve intergovernmental negotiations
because they relied for the most part on technical arguments.
The Commission’s reservations were of three types: delays in the stan-
dardization process, direct representation of interests, and monitoring
standards compliance.
The main criticism addressed by the Commission concerned the
delays, which were judged too long in the perspective of rapid harmoni-
zation. The Commission attributed this to the procedure and the concern
to include the largest number of interested parties while still favoring
consensus, instead of using qualiﬁed majority voting at certain stages.
Several actors reproached the Commission for its failure to appreciate the
conditions in which standards are drawn up. The Commission nonethe-
less remained steadfast in its criticisms, arguing that the problems lay in
the institutes’ preference for collegial functioning over project teams
when drawing up proposals, in the length of the consultation and adop-
tion procedure for standards, and in the obligation to transpose European
standards to national level.
The institutes undertook to reduce the delays: from 45 to 28 months
for ETSI, from 135 to 75 months for CEN; the result was an appreciable
increase in the number of standards produced annually. Nonetheless, the
Commission maintained that the delays remained too long and therefore
suggested again that qualiﬁed majority voting be introduced at a stage
before the ﬁnal adoption of a standard. The Council and the Parliament
took a stand against this proposal. This gave them the opportunity to
reafﬁrm the principles on which the legitimacy of standardization process
was based.
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The Parliament “opposes the use of formal voting at an early stage of standard-
ization activities with the objective of speeding the process up, since the Euro-
pean standardization process is based on mutual agreement, which in turn
safeguards the participation, involvement and conﬁdence of all parties.” (Arti-
cle 9 of Resolution on the Report from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament “Efﬁciency and Accountability in European Standardiza-
tion under the New Approach.”)
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The Commission clearly wished to use standards as a means of achieving
a single market with shorter delays. It could rely on the ETSI who, in the
ﬁeld of new technologies, was able to develop in a rather short time lag
standards which were then used to uphold the move toward a single
market, for example with the GSM standard in telecommunications
(Sandholtz 1998, 152). But the two other institutes were more time
consuming.
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Time is an inherent feature in the process of standardization. Delaying
or blocking may reﬂect a deliberate strategy on the part of the countries
chairing or providing secretarial services for a technical committee.
Extending involvement to the largest number of interested parties also
increases the “risk of deadlock and stalemate” (Egan 2001, 165): as long
as one participant rejects all or part of a proposed standard, it cannot be
ratiﬁed. Hence, either the participants do not manage to agree given
the number of vested interests, or some have an interest in delaying or
even preventing the appearance of a standard long enough to be ready
(Kessous 2000).
On a more general level, the process of standard-setting is based on
the interplay between reputation, credibility, and the ability to generate
coalitions of interests (Foray 1995 in Egan 2001). Capacities for argu-
ment and belief in the participants’ competence and integrity are the
determining modalities of this process, along with the networks in
which the participants are involved. Consensus-seeking imposes an
obligation to adopt procedures different from the ones used in delibera-
tion, where the objective is in gathering a large enough majority. The
standard-setting approach aims at bringing together the support of the
different participants gradually. This process is easier in situations of
“
 
copinage technocratique
 
” (Majone 1994, 91)—where the participants
share interests and cognitive frameworks. Things are more laborious
when it is necessary to create a climate of trust before entering into
negotiations.
 
Each standard is by no means the best possible solution from a given set of
alternatives, but rather reﬂects the complexity of the environment and the
behavior of players to decipher and order the environment to produce some
form of coordination. The outcome of the standardization process depends
partly on the pay-off structure but also on the organizational dynamics, norms,
and synergies within the standards bodies. . . . When multiple interests are
involved, coordinating costs rise and the free-rider problem can be signiﬁcant.
Recognizing that by the time the committee is convened, participants often
have vested interests that may be incompatible or well entrenched, committees,
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like markets, may also be imperfect coordinating mechanisms. Despite efforts
to promote trade liberalization by delegating to private standards bodies, the
shift in regulatory strategy did not fully achieve the required policy outcomes.
(Egan 2001, 209)
 
Relatively long timescales are therefore inherent in the standardization
process. This is acknowledged by the Council and the Parliament, but
clearly irritates the Commission.
Alongside a reduction in the delays, the Commission also proposed
that national representation be challenged as the sole source of legitimacy
in the standardization process, by opening participation to interested
representatives in Europe sitting directly and no longer being appointed
by national standards institutes—which would result, among other
things, in improved participation for certain interest groups.
 
The acceptability of standards depends to a large extent on the full involvement
of all relevant interested parties. Societal stakeholders’ [stakeholders represent
the interests of the consumer, health and safety, and the environment in stan-
dardization] participation in the standardization process has a strong account-
ability dimension. It reinforces the quality of the consensus and makes the
standards more representative.
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Once again, the Commission was clearly trying to bypass the national
level of representation, both in order to reinforce direct representation of
stakeholders at the EU level and to progressively reduce the inﬂuence of
member states on the standardization process. Not surprisingly, the
Council and the Parliament did not go along with the Commission on
this either. The Parliament pointed out that “the efﬁciency and transpar-
ency of the standardization process is not the responsibility of the Euro-
pean standards institutes alone but also of national governments, the
Commission and national standards institutes, and is consequently the
result of their joint efforts.” Nonetheless, it indicated the need to improve
representation of consumer and environmental protection organizations
at the national and European levels. In 2002, the Council asked national
institutes to “ensure the involvement of such parties in the process at
national level.”
The third and ﬁnal reservation regarding European standard-setting
has to do with the monitoring of standard implementation. Depending
on the ways that notiﬁed bodies work in various countries (more than
1,000 bodies had been notiﬁed by 2002), standards compliance monitor-
ing does not lead to the same degree of strictness; it may even enable
hidden protectionism to be reintroduced in various forms. The mem-
ber states are responsible for designation and notiﬁcation as well as
application of the criteria deﬁned in the New Approach directives to
evaluate a body’s capacity to carry out the conformity assessment pro-
cedures. Yet, there is a lack of transparency concerning the criteria and
procedures applied for the assessment and surveillance of notiﬁed bod-
ies, and this encourages “suspicions about uneven levels of implemen-
tation” and undermines conﬁdence in the certiﬁcates issues by notiﬁed
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bodies.
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 Consequently, the Commission stressed the need to arrive at a
homogeneous system of designating bodies, both “to ensure the safety
of products and to avoid restrictions on the free movement of goods
that could arise due to shortcomings in relation to the competence,
impartiality, etc. of notiﬁed bodies” and “to allow notiﬁed bodies to
compete on a level playing ﬁeld.” It also argued that the supervision of
notiﬁed bodies should be strengthened and a clearer separation
achieved between designating authorities, accreditation bodies, organi-
zations assessing conformity, and market supervisory authorities—
because confusion between these functions is a potential source of
conﬂicts of interest.
In this strategy, the laboratories responsible for certifying the confor-
mity of products to standards for the whole Union occupy a special
position.
 
In order to leave a broad initiative to businesses and to reduce costs, the
laboratories—previously sole judges on their national market—are henceforth
in competition with all the laboratories in the Community; moreover, each
Member State is able to notify several of them, and recognition has been
granted to the results of tests in different notiﬁed laboratories. The issue at stake
in this mutual recognition is to avoid protectionism by standards being
replaced by protectionism by the laboratories. The latter are therefore in an
ambivalent position: guarantors of the sound application of European law, they
are also subject to market pressures. This competition between laboratories
conﬂicts with the quest for homogeneous application of technical tests—a con-
dition for equitable competition, with each business able to go to the laboratory
that interprets the standard most favorably for its products. (Kessous 2000, 94)
 
Consequently, the monitoring of standards is one of the chief factors
currently limiting the success of standards.
However critical of the standard-setting process, the Commission was
not deterred from extending the scope of standards to services. This is
because the Commission fully supports any approach that may usefully
supplement its regulatory action, in the perspective of an evermore effec-
tive single market.
The standards institutes, meanwhile, designed new documents with
more ﬂexible statuses. Workshop agreements, in particular, are the out-
come of consensual work between a large number of parties, but they are
not subject to the publication procedure or to a vote by national represen-
tatives; consequently, they are open to a larger number of directly inter-
ested parties (without having to go through the national standards
institutes) and may be presented more rapidly. These workshop agree-
ments are justiﬁed as a means of reducing the gap between, on the one
hand, industry imposing its de facto standards and thus reducing the
participation of interested parties and, on the other, the process of Euro-
pean standard-setting. Workshops are more ﬂexible structures than tech-
nical standards committees, beneﬁting from greater openness and from
consensus. Other more ﬂexible documents such as guides, technical spec-
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iﬁcations, and technical reports, are designed to establish de facto stan-
dards. In the long run, all these documents are intended to become de
jure standards, based on their efﬁciency and the economic actors’ capacity
to work with them. A workshop agreement may thus propose several
competing solutions, leaving the market to select one; it may also simply
provide information.
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The Council approved this development in March 2002. On this occa-
sion, it stressed the necessity to relate these new documents to market
needs and to convert documents that are not de jure standards into de
jure standards. Commission, Council, and Parliament united around the
idea that it is important to enlarge the ﬁeld of standard-setting, as much
in order to improve the functioning of the internal market as to contribute
to various policies and actions.
 
The Standardization Process in the European Political 
Integration Project
 
The New Approach does not extinguish European standard-setting—far
from it. More than three quarters of European standards do not come
under a directive but result from a market initiative. Nevertheless, all
these standards and other more ﬂexible documents are gradually forming
a type of instrument based on consensus-seeking between the interested
parties by privileging technical, scientiﬁc, or experimental data. These
principles resonate with the other founding principles of the European
integration project: consensus and the role of science in the decision-
making process. The Council has stressed that “standards should have a
high degree of acceptability as a result of the full involvement of all
relevant interested parties in the standardization process and that stan-
dards should be coherent with each other. The Council also emphasized
that standards should be based on sound scientiﬁc research.”
 
14
 
Through the scope of standards and their extension to new ﬁelds, the
European standardization process acts as a powerful harmonizing fac-
tor.
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 Furthermore, it forms part of a speciﬁc process of regulation, based
on delegation by public authorities to private actors of responsibility for
drawing up binding documents. These documents’ robustness derives
from the fact that they act as strong incentives while leaving some oper-
ators the possibility to innovate. In other words, observing a standard
amounts to compliance with regulations, but with the proviso that an
economic actor can always come up with another way of conforming to
the regulations.
Consequently, we must wonder about the nature of a political system
in which the rules are partly of private origin, based on consensus, and
voluntary in application. The European Parliament itself points out that
standards may in certain circumstances constitute an alternative to legis-
lation. While the Commission situates the standardization process within
the context of thinking on governance in Europe:
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Current reﬂections on governance in Europe focus on alternative forms of
regulation and on democratic legitimacy and expertise. Today, the Commu-
nity’s New Approach . . . is considered a well-implemented coregulatory
model.
 
16
 
Thus, it says, the New Approach is a model of co-regulation.
 
Co-regulation combines binding legislative and regulatory action with actions
taken by the actors most concerned, drawing on their practical expertise. The
result is wider ownership of the policies in question by involving those most
affected by implementing rules in their preparation and enforcement. This often
achieves better compliance, even where the detailed rules are non-binding.
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Hence, the task of legislation is to set objectives that can be attained
and that remain stable. The essential requirements are those around
which “no compromise is possible,” states an internal Commission
document (
 
The New Approach: quo vadis?
 
) By referring the deﬁnition of
technical speciﬁcations to the standard-setting process, the legislature
is no longer the prisoner of experts or even of interest groups work-
ing behind the scenes. It can thus reduce the risk of “policy capture”
by organized interests. But the objective is also to reduce the gap
between the EU and public opinion, pointed out in the White Paper
on Governance, by opening up the decision-making process to a
larger number.
In these conditions, the Commission proposes to enlarge the ﬁeld
of standards to the general safety of products, an approach “which
reﬂects the contribution standards can make to the proper function-
ing of the internal market and the protection of consumer health
and safety.” Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of December 3, 2001 thus provides that “[a] product
shall be presumed safe as far as the risks and risk categories cov-
ered by relevant national standards are concerned when it conforms
to voluntary national standards transposing European standards, the
references of which have been published by the Commission in the
 
Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Communities
 
” (Article 3[2]).
The Commission also suggests the use of new documents in Commu-
nity policies, whenever consensus has to be reached within a relatively
short time. This, however, is conditional on certain principles being
observed.
 
The Lisbon European Council stressed that business and citizens need a regu-
latory environment which is clear, effective and workable in a rapidly changing
global market place, and that formal regulation is not always the answer.
Alternative, complementary approaches can sometimes provide more effective
solutions. The challenge is to ensure high levels of protection while avoiding
over-regulation. The New Approach to technical harmonization and standard-
ization is a model that combines these two requirements and the Council
invited the Commission to examine whether the New Approach can be applied
to sectors not yet covered as a means of improving and simplifying legislation
wherever possible.
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However, in 1985, it was possible to identify sectors in which essential
requirements could be dissociated from technical speciﬁcations, and, in
doing so, to take the view that, in other sectors, the protection of the public
interest made it necessary for legislation to impose technical speciﬁca-
tions. Nowadays, with the rapid development of technologies, it is
increasingly difﬁcult to impose methods or techniques that will defend
the public interest. The New Approach thus faces the challenge of being
applicable to a whole set of objects that go beyond its initial framework.
 
3. The Standardization Process in France
 
Like the European case, the use of standards in France is a response to
the difﬁculties encountered by the state in ensuring its tasks are carried
out, whether they involve drawing up regulations, imposing them on all
the actors in society, guaranteeing and monitoring their implementation,
or measuring their effects. Furthermore, standards have developed in
ways that situate them within the scope of Bruno Jobert’s (2003) analysis:
they are part of “a new mode of production of public policy no longer
based so much on the imposition of norms created by state actors but on
a systematized transaction between the different parties affected by the
policy. . . . Legitimacy is no longer sought in the policy’s conformity to
central values but in the smooth functioning of the procedures governing
the interaction” (see introduction to this volume). Standards constitute,
as it were, the culmination of this process, a form of depoliticization of
public policy.
Unlike the European standardization process however, which, from the
outset, has set out the principles on which it is based, French standard-
setting seems to be more part of a silent revolution.
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 The importance of
standards still goes unrecognized in a number of sectors, disappearing
behind the authorities’ stated desire to maintain a capacity for interven-
tion. Even though ministries encourage increasing use of standards in the
sectors for which they have responsibility, ofﬁcial discourse continues to
stress regulatory action: the food sector provides an illustration of this. In
parallel, the authorities see standards as an efﬁcient instrument of eco-
nomic policy, which also enables some of the constraints of Europe to be
circumvented: the growth in AFNOR’s role is highly instructive from this
point of view.
However, this dual instrumentalization conceals questions about the
signiﬁcance of standard-setting as a procedure: while the principles of
consensus, participation and use of expertise play a major role in legiti-
mizing European standards, they do not occupy as important a role in
France. Here, in contrast, the chief stakes in standard-setting lie in the
pooling of information between a grouping of diverse agents who have
worked together or will have to do so subsequently. In that respect, the
procedure for developing standards in France is far closer to a process of
delegating the regulation of an activity to social actors—with public
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authorities still in control—taking into account the interdependencies that
bring the different actors together to draw up the rules by which their
relations will be governed.
 
Standard-Setting and Regulation by the Private Sector: The Case of 
Food Products
 
The food-production sector is characterized by the increasing role of
private sector agents in creating and enforcing rules, notably in the man-
agement of food health safety. Standards occupy a determining place in
this movement. Furthermore, the crises and scandals related to food
safety during the 1990s did not alter this trend but, on the contrary,
encouraged public authorities to further the delegation of power to pri-
vate actors.
In 1983, the Law on Consumer Protection reafﬁrmed the need to ensure
the safety of products for human health, strengthened the monitoring
powers of the state services, and required ﬁrms to implement self-
monitoring procedures. Given the lack of resources to ensure conformity
to the rules enacted, as well as a preference for industry-led monitoring
systems, the public sector deﬁnes objectives and thresholds, leaving pri-
vate sector actors to adopt the necessary means and measures to comply
with these and to enforce compliance. This makes the state’s work easier
when it comes to verifying that the procedures have actually been fol-
lowed, while delegating the responsibility for exercising controls to the
private sector. The objective was to guarantee food safety through a ﬂex-
ible system, adapted to the development of innovations, and to the free
movement of goods. The same strategy was later adopted at the European
level when the single market was established. France played a major role
in the adoption of Council Directive 93/43/EEC of June 14, 1993, which
lays down the general rules of hygiene for foodstuffs and requires that
businesses adopt self-monitoring procedures based on the hazard analy-
sis and critical control point (HACCP) method.
Thus, standards gradually spread across the food industry. With the
food scandals of the 1990s, the public authorities were sustained in their
increasing desire to delegate enforcement of compliance with the regula-
tions through the use of standards to the private sector. The HACCP
method is the best known: industry takes responsibility for the safety of
its own processes, while the state’s external ﬁeld services monitor the
application of the procedures at a secondary level. Quality assurance
standards or approaches are another example, setting standards for
means rather than for outcome: they deﬁne the stages of compliance, and
often require the production of written, measurement-based data. These
standards, as well as being public policy instruments, operate in three
distinct registers.
First, they belong to the general context already described, in which
the public authorities delegate the enforcement of regulatory measures to
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private sector actors. Faced with increasingly extended, complex chains
of interdependence in the food sector, with subject matter that demands
a constantly updated scientiﬁc and technical mastery, and with lack of
resources, the supervising ministries (Agriculture and Finance) rely on
industry—producers and retailers—to take charge of regulating its own
activity.
However, standards may also come to supplement regulatory action,
without this having been provided for initially. This is the case when
regulation does not achieve the objectives laid down for it in terms of risk
reduction, as was the case with the Decree of December 8, 1997, which
governs the use in agriculture of urban sewage sludge (Borraz and d’Arci-
moles 2003). Compliance with this legislation by sewage sludge produc-
ers was not enough to reassure its users, and still less the purchasers of
agricultural products, who took a stand against it. The manure-spreading
trade then undertook to elaborate a “Reference System for Certiﬁcation
of Agricultural Recycled Fertilizer Application Services” in consultation
with representatives of the public authorities, the water industry, the
food-processing industry, and food retailers. In a context where adminis-
trative monitoring capacities and state regulation of urban sewage sludge
application were largely inadequate, this approach aimed to combat loss
of trust in the public authorities by transferring trust toward a certiﬁca-
tion. But in taking on this responsibility, the private sector actors are in
effect accepting the imposition of stricter performance rules than those
laid down by legislation. A certiﬁed system must conform to all the
regulatory provisions in force but must also meet a number of additional
requirements. In so doing, standards actually contribute to the credibility
of the scientiﬁc and regulatory data mobilized.
The third register in which standards operate concerns the deﬁnition
of rules and the production of information among the different actors
involved in an activity. Scandals and controversies in the food sector
highlighted complex chains of interdependencies between a diversity of
actors, often unfamiliar with one another. Food industry and retailers, in
particular, realized that they were in a dependent situation in relation to
their suppliers, but they refused to take on the role of the state in check-
ing that their suppliers complied with the regulations, especially because
they had only limited trust in this compliance or in the capacity of the
regulations to reduce risk effectively. But when their suppliers presented
them with standards or quality insurance schemes, these constituted
familiar instruments. Not only do they themselves use them, but they are
also convinced that these instruments are more effective, by virtue of the
way they are developed (broad consultation of the different interested
parties), their voluntary nature, and the threat represented by a with-
drawal of certiﬁcation in the case of non-compliance (notiﬁed, moreover,
by a third party). Thus, the certiﬁcation approach adopted for urban
sewage sludge application is directly inspired by quality control strate-
gies established by the various parties involved in the food-production
 76 OLIVIER BORRAZ
 
chain in order to monitor production processes. The approach consists
of bringing urban sewage sludge application systems into a
“quality infrastructure” (Foray 1995, 142). Conceived as a reference stan-
dard that breaks the quality of the service down into objectiﬁed charac-
teristics, the Certiﬁcation Reference System aims to make procedures for
agricultural application services compatible with the quality require-
ments of the food-production industries. Its provisions act as guarantees
that a product now viewed as an integral part of the food-production
system can reach agricultural land. Because it is accompanied by a num-
ber of indicators and instruments for monitoring and analysis, and
because it replicates measures that apply in the food-production chain,
certiﬁcation of urban sewage sludge application thus forms a solid set of
criteria that are intelligible and accessible to the actors in this chain.
Certiﬁcation is therefore somewhat similar to a judgment device, draw-
ing its effectiveness from two intimately connected components: “cogni-
tion and trust” (Karpik 1996, 538).
The importance of trust in regulation has been underpinned by Jor-
dana and Levi-Faur (2004). They insist on “the dynamic process of
trust-building between social and political actors” (14), not as a substi-
tute to the role of expertise, but as a reaction to the growing number of
interested parties and the complex interdependencies in which they are
caught. In this context, the aim of standard-setting as a regulatory activ-
ity is the production of common and shared knowledge between a vari-
ety of actors, upon which they can base their activity and interactions.
While in the past, the function of knowledge-production belonged pri-
marily to the state, it now belies upon the interested parties. Mean-
while, a shift has occurred, from the shared belief that knowledge
produced by the state was legitimate given central government’s capac-
ity to uphold the general interest, to shared understandings around
rules best capable of protecting the different interests at stake. This, in
turn, provides an answer to the “demands for more transparency and
accountability” (15) because standards create expectations not only on
the part of public authorities but also with respect to the engagements
taken by the different parties. Trust in public regulation now operates
indirectly, through conﬁdence in standards proclaiming the need to
enforce regulation. More importantly, standards can provide clear and
stable answers as to who is responsible or is in charge in case of an
accident. Given the fact that previous crises and scandals in the ﬁeld of
food and health underpinned the absence of any such clear identiﬁca-
tion, private actors and public authorities alike, along with NGOs,
expect standards to ﬁll in the void. Hence, standard-setting is an impor-
tant feature of the regulatory state, in its capacity to develop or encour-
age processes of trust-building.
In the food-production industry, the ensuing familiarity of this in-
strument stems from the scale of standardization and certiﬁcation
approaches, initially around quality and more recently around safety
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issues (Borraz, Besançon, and Clergeau 2006). “Through standardization
and certiﬁcation, quality policy aims to adapt food-production structures
to fragmented markets. It is also directed towards globalization of quality
products within the European market through harmonization” (Nicolas
and Valceschini 1995, 31). These procedures have proved particularly
useful from the point of view of the single market: by obtaining recogni-
tion of these certiﬁcates, France has been able to thwart the effects of the
free movement of goods and protect small producers in certain areas. This
touches on the second dimension of standardization in France—its use as
an instrument of economic policy.
 
Service Standards
 
In order to understand the use of standardization as an instrument of
economic policy, we must look at the changing role of AFNOR. This
organization has been subject to challenge, for two decades now, by the
different standards, marks, quality seals, and other forms of certiﬁcation
that have proliferated in a number of sectors. AFNOR has also lost inﬂu-
ence through the development of European standardization.
 
The weak requirements for gaining the CE marking (where speciﬁcations with
regulatory aims seek minimal safety rather than better quality, and where
award of the mark is based on the manufacturer’s own declaration rather than
on a formal certiﬁcation procedure), has forced the “NF” mark to differentiate
itself “at the top”, by placing the emphasis on aspects that would be better
described as “normative”—in other words, “voluntary” rather than “regula-
tory” standardization, “performance” rather than just “safety”, “third-party
certiﬁed” rather than “self-declared” (since this is hard to monitor). The CE
marking—which essentially covers manufactured products—has driven “NF”
to differentiate itself laterally too, through the development of new ﬁelds of
application for French certiﬁcation, including the environment (1992), food
production (1994) and the service sector (1994). (Cochoy 2000, 85)
 
In a context where the state has withdrawn its funding, this evolution
toward service standards puts AFNOR in a position to mobilize new
resources by becoming a service company for businesses that wish to
develop their export activities. Nevertheless, it preserves “a base of pro-
cedures for the socio-technical characterization and appraisal of objects”
and continues to offer “a space for debate” (Cochoy 2000, 86). The exam-
ple of the customer service standard NF P 15-900-1, which deﬁnes guide-
lines for service activities in drinking water supply and wastewater
treatment illustrates this change (Diallo 2002).
This standard follows on from the ﬁnancial scandals around the dele-
gation of water services during the 1980s to private ﬁrms. The water
distribution companies and the licensing local authorities wanted to stan-
dardize this activity, in order to answer the criticisms they had suffered.
The standard was drawn up by a committee including representatives
of consumer groups, state and local authorities, experts, water distribu-
tion and treatment ﬁrms, and AFNOR. The preparatory work for this
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committee was done by a subcommittee consisting of two representatives
from water companies, one AFNOR representative, one representative of
a public–private partnership water management company, and two rep-
resentatives of consumer groups. This subcommittee deﬁned the frame-
work of the standard and then presented its work to the full committee.
In entrusting the chairing of the committee to a consumer group, the
water companies wished to demonstrate their goodwill. The develop-
ment process itself was carried out in a consensual manner and the busi-
ness representatives acceded to most of the demands made by the
consumer groups, which related to improving the level of beneﬁt to the
customer.
However, this standard cannot be understood solely from the point of
view of those taking part in developing it or of their capacity to reach a
compromise.
First of all, this standard illustrates the change in AFNOR’s role. As its
membership charter explains:
 
Businesses today have realized that the standard represents a means of achiev-
ing competitiveness on international markets. Therefore, from now on the
battle for standardization will be fought at the global level. . . . Should we be
taking steps to promote the options offered by French technology? Or should
we be waiting for others to impose their choices on us? If you do not defend
our standards, others will impose theirs on you.
 
The charter also deﬁnes the new role of standards precisely: “to establish
a frame of reference for their sector, in order to make—or oppose—
concrete proposals during European or international negotiations.”
AFNOR takes the view that service activities, which represent 70% of
gross national product (GNP) of industrialized countries, ought to be
subject to standardization in the same way as manufactured products—
and this standardization is a major economic stake for businesses that
want to open up markets, protect themselves, and be competitive.
Second of all, water distribution companies have an interest in playing
an integral role in this approach, partly in response to the pressures that
came to bear on them from the 1980s with regard to the conditions under
which public utilities were assigned to them, the problems of ﬁxing a scale
of prices or water quality issues, but mainly in order to extend their
activities on an international level. Because the French water market is
almost saturated and offers low rates of proﬁtability, the major French
undertakings in the sector are turning to deregulating foreign markets in
order to derive new proﬁts. The existence of an AFNOR standard—
intended to rapidly become an ISO standard—represents a considerable
asset in this campaign of conquest, for two reasons. First, because this
standard relies largely on the experience acquired by French companies
in managing water and drainage services in France, it will be much easier
to conform to it when it becomes international in scope. Second, ﬁnancial
aid from the World Bank to the water market is often linked to compliance
with the standards in force in the sector; and international invitations to
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tender generally impose standards compliance. Once again, French busi-
nesses will have an advantage over their foreign competitors from the
outset.
In this case, an Anglo-American proposal for a standard covering the
design and construction of drinking water networks and wastewater
treatment plants was under study, which would have favored equipment
manufacturers to the detriment of distribution and wastewater treatment
companies. This standard would have led to the exclusion of French
technologies: French businesses therefore had every interest in develop-
ing a more general standard. Furthermore, this was a sector in which
European standards institutes had not intervened: while the EU imposes
the status quo on national standards institutes in those sectors where the
European standards institutes operate, there is no comparable constraint
in other sectors. Thus, standard-setting appears to function as a state
policy, in that the state supports national businesses, notably in strategic
sectors where these businesses occupy dominant positions.
In this example, the discrepancy between the process of developing
the standard and the objectives pursued by the main protagonists—the
businesses, the state, and AFNOR—may be surprising. A document that
initially responded to national considerations and was developed in
consultation between consumer groups, experts, and industry, has
proved, in the ﬁnal analysis, to be a powerful weapon in the campaign to
conquer markets—an objective that was never explicitly mentioned dur-
ing the process of development. In fact, the principal actors of the stan-
dard did not have clear, precise knowledge of the broader issues at stake.
In other words, when the water companies engaged in the process, their
objective was to reduce the risk of future contestation in France from
angry customers or consumer associations. It is only during the process
that they, along with public ofﬁcials, understood the larger beneﬁts they
could gain from such a standard and clearly saw the opportunity unfold-
ing before them. This helps to underscore the issue of unintentionality in
standard-setting: the discovery of opportunities not planned initially, but
which appear during the process and present the parties with new
resources.
Standard-setting thus constitutes a public policy instrument on behalf
of economic policy, defended by the state and carried through by AFNOR
with the assistance of relevant businesses. Similar phenomena can be
observed at the EU level. The creation of a policy domain in telecommu-
nications was initiated by the Commission, based on growing pressure
from a range of societal actors (equipment manufacturers, major business
users, new service providers, potential operators of alternative infrastruc-
tures), driven by a rising level of cross-border transactions, and with the
decisive contribution of ETSI in providing a common standard (GSM)
(Sandholtz 1998). When GSM became the dominant world standard, this
proved to be a decisive element in favor of European ﬁrms on the world-
wide market. Yet, it is far from clear that promoters of EU telecommuni-
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cations policy had, at the outset, a clear view of the wider economic stakes
on a worldwide level; their initial objective was to create a single telecom-
munications market, based on a common standard, against the vested
interests of the member states to protect national telecommunications
monopolies.
The two French examples provide evidence of signiﬁcant evolution in
the instruments of state policy and in the role played by standards. This
evolution is neither sudden nor violent. On the contrary, it forms an
intrinsic part of a long-term trend, whether in the development of quality
certiﬁcation in the food-production ﬁeld or in the intrusion of the market
into AFNOR standard-setting. However, it is a trend that takes every
opportunity to gather strength in the context of economic globalization
and the European integration project. The state ﬁnds in the use of stan-
dards a good method of responding to the constraints that these two
phenomena bring to bear, as well as a means of protecting national eco-
nomic sectors such as small farmers or major ﬁrms in the urban services
sector.
Standard-setting in the food sector also shows that there is a willing-
ness on the part of the state to delegate the enforcement of its legislation
to private sector actors, when it lacks the resources necessary for enforce-
ment or monitoring. These examples thus indicate that the wider use of
standards clearly expresses a profound change in the state’s capacities for
action. Delegation to private actors, whether to industry or to an organi-
zation like AFNOR, of some of the tasks previously carried out by state
services is one of several markers of changes in progress. Standard-setting
is a substitute, as well as an aid, for state action.
 
Conclusion
 
Europe and France offer contrasting examples of the use of standards—
and, it must be stressed, the instances given here are by no means exhaus-
tive. Both encourage the development of standards in a context where the
state (or quasi-state, in the case of the EU) no longer has adequate instru-
ments to carry out its tasks and to respond to the problems facing it, but
they differ on several points.
The European approach displays basic principles that coincide with
the guiding principles of the European integration project. The standard-
ization process is made to coincide with a political theorization, which is
in return inﬂuenced by the development of standards as a model of co-
regulation. There is nothing similar to this process of co-production of
theory and instrument in France.
The two levels also differ in the way they share tasks between public
authorities and private actors. The European standardization process is
based on a distinct cleavage between the public sector deﬁning the objec-
tives and the private sector developing the means to achieve them. The
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French process reveals an enmeshed situation, in which the authorities
delegate implementation of legislation, regulation of private sector activ-
ity, and promotion of the interests of French industry to the private
actors. This provides for different degrees of integration of standards in
the two systems: although more politically integrated within the EU,
they leave greater room for maneuver to the social actors in drawing up
standards; less recognized in France, standard-setting is more integrated
into administrative functions, both in developing standards and in mon-
itoring them.
Finally, given that the EU and France are two very different polities,
standards do not ﬁt in identically within their respective evolution toward
a regulatory state.
At the European level, standards are instruments of supranational
governance. This is a perfect illustration of unintentionality in policy
instruments because the standardization process was not conceived with
this objective. Initially destined to quicken the pace toward the achieve-
ment of a single market, and as such an instrument of intergovernmental
politics, standards progressively opened perspectives for a more inte-
grated approach. This is partly because of the fact that standards build
on the “the presence and inﬂuence of transnational actors—interest
groups, business, knowledge-based elites—on policy processes and out-
comes” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 10). In the eyes of the Commis-
sion, the standardization process offers the opportunity to reduce the
inﬂuence of national interests on rulemaking by building on the growing
inﬂuence of transnational exchanges. In order to do this, they must rely
on the standards institutes, who have perceived the beneﬁts of such a
transformation as a way to gain more autonomy. “As supranational orga-
nizations and rules emerge and solidify, they constitute transnational
society by establishing bases for interaction and access points for inﬂu-
encing policy. As transnational society endures and expands, the organi-
zations and rules that structure behaviors become more deeply rooted as
‘givens,’ taken for granted as deﬁning political life” (Stone Sweet and
Sandholtz 1998, 11). Hence, standards clearly reveal and simultaneously
play an active part in the formation of a transnational society upheld by
a supranational framework of governance.
In France, standards are an instrument in (and of) state transforma-
tion. Here again, they were not initially conceived as such, and it is
only following a series of crises which revealed major dysfunctions
within the state, along with larger economic and political changes, that
administrative agents saw the use they could make of standards in reg-
ulating highly complex and interdependent domains, or in promoting
French economic interests on a wider scale. Although it is not clear if,
in so doing, they modiﬁed the nature of these instruments, they have
certainly contributed to an unexpected extension of regulation. They
have simultaneously contributed to a redeﬁnition of boundaries
between the public and private spheres, not so much in the sense that
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these boundaries are now blurred, but rather in the sense that rulemak-
ing regarding the behavior of social actors is a growing part of the lat-
ter’s activity and not the sole responsibility of the state. In reality, this
has always been the case: the difference lies in the fact that these rules
are now openly negotiated, codiﬁed, and enforceable. Analyzing this
situation as an extension or a regression of the state (or of civil society)
is meaningless; rather, it seems more important to stress that standards
serve as an instrument of renegotiation of the state’s role and inﬂuence
in a changing society.
 
Notes
 
1. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the term standards will from now on apply
solely to de jure standards.
2.
 
Association française de normalisation
 
 (AFNOR).
3. Preamble to the resolution adopted February 12, 1999.
4. The European Committee for Standards (CEN), the European Committee
for Electrical Standards (CENELEC), and the European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute (ETSI).
5. European Commission, 
 
Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on the
New Approach and the Global Approach
 
, Luxembourg, Ofﬁcial Publications
Ofﬁce of the European Communities, 2000, Introduction, 1.
6. Similarly, in France in the immediate postwar period, ﬁrst efforts toward
standardization related to the gas industry because of its dangerous nature,
among other reasons (Cochoy 2000).
7. The “New Approach directives” are based on Article 95 of the EC Treaty
and adopted under the codecision procedure provided for in Article 251 of
the EC Treaty. It should be borne in mind that according to Article 95, the
Commission’s proposals on health, safety, environmental protection, and
consumer protection must take a high level of protection as their basis.
Thus, a safeguard clause is also provided for.
8. Commission Report of September 26, 2001.
9. COM(98)0291 -C4-0442/98), adopted February 12, 1999.
10. The differences between the three standards institutes relate largely to the
nature of the areas they cover. ETSI works especially on intellectual prop-
erty rights and related technologies, CENELEC relies heavily on existing or
pending international standards, while CEN is concerned with new ﬁelds
like ergonomics, food irradiation, and environmental management, which
are more time consuming because of the need to innovate (Egan 2001).
11. Commission Report of September 26, 2001.
12. Commission Communication of May 7, 2003.
13. New products were used in this way in the directive on electronic signa-
tures (1999/93/EC), which authorizes the Commission to adopt technical
speciﬁcations drawn up by CEN and ETSI.
14. Commission Report of September 26, 2001.
15. In  2003,  according  to  the  Commission,  trade  in  products  from just the
main sectors regulated by “New Approach” directives exceeded
 
€
 
1,500,000,000,000 a year.
16. Commission Report of September 26, 2001.
17. White Paper on European Governance of July 25, 2001.
18. Commission Report of September 26, 2001.
19. The conditions under which standard-setting activities—entrusted to the
AFNOR—must be carried on are laid down in Decree No. 84-74 of January
26, 1994. In certain circumstances, the application of a standard may be
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made compulsory by the authorities—thus giving the standard regulatory
status.
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